

Behind the Headlines of the Eagle Gold Mine Crisis




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
November 18, 2025

Eagle Gold Mine remains a crisis.




Today's Session:

- Understanding FNNND's role before, during, and after the disaster
- The Impacts that Didn't Make Headlines: 18 month look back
- The Failures Before the Failure: Systemic Issues that Contributed to the Crisis
- Where Are We Now? What has Changed?
- What Needs to Happen Next




A First Nation's Voice During a Crisis




FNNND's Role Defined by Our Treaty

- Included from the start. Before the planning, included in the planning.
- Together, we would have an understanding of the landscape, before the footprint.
- A Genuine partner at all stages.
- Our consent is meaningful to this partnership.




FNNND's Role in Practice


- No transparency and stand process for YFN involvement
- Reduced to a "check-box" in YESAB's proposal, with limited follow up for accountability.
- Consistently left out of conversations, decision making, and desired outcomes.
- Our consent is not being respected - to this day.




The Impacts that Didn't Make Headlines: 18 month look back



Mike Gordon's Story



Heap Status, Stabilization, and Remediation



Heap Status and Stabilization



Heap Leach Facility
Oct 2, 2024



Heap Leach Facility
Oct 2, 2025



Heap Status and Remediation



**Excavating material above
failure scarp, Sept. 15**



**Placing material at back of
HLF, Sept. 15**

- **Phase 1a Remediation – started August 10**
 - Relocate portions of the 1065 bench to reduce load on the upper failure scarp
 - 200,000 m³ of material relocated to the back of the HLF on existing liner

Photos: VGC



Heap Status and Remediation

- **Phase 1b Remediation**

- Improve stability of failure scarp to allow access to failure areas and planning for Phase 2
- 800,000 m³ of material from benches adjacent to the failure



Relocating ore from above the failure scarp,
Nov. 9



Heap Status and Remediation

- There has been **no investigation of heap conditions** within the failed zone, including the retaining dam
- Phase 1a and 1b work aimed at creating conditions that will allow further investigation and planning for heap remediation
- Heap remediation will be complex and challenging, and **the work has barely begun**



Heap Leach Facility Oct 2, 2025



Heap Status and Remediation

- Recirculation of cyanide solution onto the heap finally ceased in June
- **Reduced (but did not stop) the ongoing overflow of cyanide solution over the dam and into the Dublin Gulch Valley**
- Angled well drilled into the In-Heap Pond
- Commissioned August 2025
- Appears unable to pump at rates sufficient to drain the In-Heap Pond
- **Stopping the overflow of heap solution into the Dublin Gulch Valley must be a high priority**



Heap Status and Remediation

Figure A.1.40: 450-mm screened-steel pump intakes



Note: Base elevation 910.5 m
Source: VGC

Source: IRB Report




Heap Status and Remediation

- Independent Review Board and Delve Underground considered condition of the heap, liner and solution collection systems
 - Equipment from the bottom of the In-Heap Pond swept away in the failure
 - Pumping systems destroyed
 - Flawed and sub-standard liner construction and operational practices led to damage of critical liner components (e.g. geosynthetic clay liner) in some locations including outside of areas affected by failure
 - The extent of liner and leach collection system damage caused by the failure is unknown
- Confirming the integrity of liner and leach collection systems, especially in the In-Heap Pond will be a complex and costly undertaking with enormous engineering challenges and, safety and environmental risks to overcome
- There is no precedent or road map for how to do this
- **How and whether the heap can be repaired remains a substantial uncertainty**



Cyanide Solution & Water Management



Cyanide Solution and Water Management


- Cyanide solution management
 - Surface water collection
 - Groundwater collection
 - Storage
 - Treatment
- Mine-contact water (non-cyanide) management
 - Separation
 - Collection
 - Conveyance
 - Storage
 - Treatment



DG2 Sump,
June 5, 2025



Cyanide Solution and Water Management



Source: VGC



Groundwater (Cyanide Solution) Collection

- **Groundwater related effects in Haggart Creek initially observed in September 2024**
- Collection of seepage near Haggart Creek began October 21, 2024
 - W22-Seep 2
- Intermittent collection of groundwater at other locations through winter of 2024
 - Sump DG4, Nov. 16 to Dec. 18, and then beginning on March 5
 - Well MW10-DG7, Jan. 23 to Feb. 5 and then beginning on February 16
- **Groundwater related effects continued to increase through the winter**



DG4 Sump, October 2025



Groundwater (Cyanide Solution) Collection

- Systematic groundwater collection:
 - Wells drilled fall 2024
 - Collection in wells downstream of Control Pond – May 20, 2025
 - Collection in wells upstream of Control Pond – May 28, 2025



**Groundwater Wells Upstream of
Control Pond, October 2025**



Groundwater (Cyanide Solution) Collection

Cyanide Solution Storage: Ponds			
Pond	Available Date	Capacity (m ³)	Total Capacity (m ³)
Events Pond	Pre-failure	248,000	314,000
Control Pond	Pre-failure	66,000	314,000
IROSA 1	September 14, 2024	24,000	338,000
Pit Pond 1/2 Phase 1	September 21, 2024	120,000	458,000
Pit Pond 1/2 Phase 2	October 11, 2024	55,000	513,000
IROSA 2	October 28, 2024	85,000	598,000
Pit Pond 3	April 27, 2025	74,000	672,000
1075 Pond	May 30, 2025	84,000	756,000

Pit Pond 1/2,
June 2025




Water Management Inter-relationships

- **Groundwater collection protects Haggart Creek**
- Collected water must be stored and eventually treated
- If you don't have effective treatment – i.e., winter of 2024/25 – you have to store water
- Pond construction delays = groundwater in Haggart Creek
- **You don't know what's coming in the future – e.g., freshet**
 - Do you collect cyanide solution that you know is going to Haggart Creek now (groundwater)?
 - Do you save space for cyanide solution that might come later?
 - Should you build more storage so you can do both?



Storage Capacity and Stored Volumes



Source of base graph, Government of Yukon



Discharge of Water/Cyanide Solution

Discharge Location	Effluent Type	Dates	Volumes (m ³)
IROSA 2 Pond	Untreated cyanide solution	December 2024	18,000
IROSA 2 Pond	Partially treated cyanide solution*	January to April 2025	113,000
Eagle Creek (tributary of Haggart Creek)	Treated non-compliant cyanide solution**	February to March 2025	87,000
Haggart Creek	Treated non-compliant cyanide solution	April to November 2025	964,000
Eagle Creek (tributary of Haggart Creek)	Untreated mine-contact water (non-cyanide)	April to May 2025	23,000
Eagle Creek (tributary of Haggart Creek)	Treated mine-contact water (non-cyanide)	May to June 2025	17,000
Haggart Creek	Treated mine-contact water (non-cyanide)	June to October 2025	110,000

* Partially treated cyanide solution = treated but not confirmed to be non-toxic, and non-compliant for some licence limits

** Treated non-compliant cyanide solution = treated and confirmed non-toxic, but non-compliant for some licence limits (e.g., cobalt, nitrite)



IROSA 2 POND: The Leaky Pond

- IROSA Pond 2 identified as leaky in mid-December 2024
- Over 50,000 m³ of untreated and partially treated cyanide solution was discharged to the environment through the leaky pond between December 2024 and April 2025
- Pond is currently being repaired



Repair of IROSA 2, October 2025




FNNND's Influence

- Since late June 2024, First Nation of Na-Cho Nyak Dun has advocated for:
 - Rapid construction of storage
 - Collection of surface and groundwater
 - Water treatment
- We have been disappointed by unnecessary delays in pond construction and groundwater collection which have caused adverse effects
- **These remain as critical priorities to protect the environment**



Cyanide Solution & Water Treatment




Cyanide Solution & Water Treatment

- **Over \$200 million has been spent so far, primarily to reduce cyanide leakage into the environment following the failure.**
- Non-cyanide contact water (arsenic, cadmium, etc.) is temporarily treated with flocculant, allowed to settle (initially in leaky IROSA Pond 2 but now IROSA Pond 1), and then discharged to Haggart Creek.
- A highly complex and costly treatment process was implemented to treat cyanide-impacted water and produce effluent that is not acutely toxic



Cyanide Solution & Water Treatment



- After **five months** of testing, upgrading, retrofitting, and winterizing the water treatment plant, treatment of cyanide-impacted water began in February 2025. **Multiple incidents of toxic effluent discharge were observed** until process metrics were identified and optimized to produce acutely non-toxic effluent.



Cyanide Solution & Water Treatment

- Approximately 1 million m³ of cyanide-impacted water has been treated to date.
- **The treatment plant effluent remains elevated in copper, nickel, cobalt, and nitrites.**
- The treated water is not acutely toxic but **continues to cause chronic toxicity in Haggart Creek.**
- Water quality in Haggart Creek can be significantly improved for both cobalt and cyanide using a treatment already demonstrated successfully on-site at a smaller scale, pending available funding for implementation.
- **The treatment plant is scheduled to shut down in mid-November.**



Cyanide Solution & Water Treatment

- **Despite permit requirements, no cyanide destruction system was in place before the June 2024 failure.** NND cautioned for 1.5 years that VGC's alternate cyanide destruction plan was not viable; YG proceeded without proof of performance.




FNNND's Influence

- **FNNND played a key role in preventing further disaster immediately after the failure.**
 - Conducted preliminary testing onsite and offsite to help evaluate and compare treatment options.
 - Engaged BQE Water after the earlier contract with Linkan proved unsuccessful.
 - FNNND recommended in-pond cyanide treatment (using peroxide and sodium bisulfite) well before it was adopted, now proven highly effective with major cyanide reductions onsite.
 - FNNND developed and submitted a long-term treatment plan in advance, including a Best Available Technology (BAT) assessment that became the foundation of the RFP now awarded for preliminary design.
 - FNNND advocated in-situ biological treatment for water collected onsite to support long-term closure and remediation; this is now applied successfully in the 1075 Pond, with sample monitoring underway.



Downstream Effects




Downstream Effects


- Technical teams
- Monitoring plans
- Downstream water quality
- Fish and aquatic life monitoring
- Contaminant monitoring
- Haggart Creek grayling run protection




Downstream Effects




Downstream Effects



Cyanide in Haggart Creek



Cobalt in Haggart Creek




Water Quality Questions

- Can they intercept enough groundwater to avoid last winter's toxic conditions?
- How much contaminated groundwater has escaped from the initial slide and subsequent flow from the damaged heap leach pad and where did it or will it go?
- Has cyanide in the groundwater precipitated into sediments to form a potential pool that may be the source of future discharges into the environment?
-



Fish Monitoring



Other Aquatic Monitoring

- Aquatic insects
- Algae on creek bottoms
- Sediments
- Salmon spawning and rearing surveys
- Winter habitat and fish distribution surveys



Aquatic Monitoring Questions

- We know some contaminants in Haggart Creek were at levels known to cause chronic or lethal effects on fish and other aquatic life. What were the actual effects?
- What are the cumulative effects on mine disaster, placer operations, and fire-related permafrost slumps on Haggart Creek?




Contaminants Monitoring

- Grayling and sculpins (summer) in Haggart Creek
- Grayling and pike (winter) in the South McQuesten River
- Aquatic insects in Haggart Creek
- Moose and caribou in the McQuesten River watershed
- Beavers, muskrats, mink, and otters in traplines downriver of the mine.



Mercury Monitoring





Integrating Indigenous Knowledge with Western Science to Create Monitoring Programs for a Toxic Spill on Traditional Territory

L. Rear, M. O'Donoghue, R. Slater *First Nation of Na-cho Nyäk Dun (FNNND)*



Introduction-Mining Disaster

June 2024: a landslide at Eagle Gold Mine (central Yukon) released millions of liters of toxic cyanide solution into Haggart Creek – upstream of culturally significant spawning grounds for Chinook salmon and on the traditional territory of the FNNND.



FNNND's Collaborative Response Strategy

1. Indigenous Governance

FNNND addressed the environmental disaster by **mandating and facilitating collaboration** between multiple agencies, by initiating the creation of technical working groups to monitor the effects to the receiving environment. FNNND continues to host and maintain these groups to the present. This aligns with FNNND's values of Caring-Sharing-Teaching-Respect.

2. Holistic Scope

FNNND broadened the scope of the response to reflect the more holistic view of the First Nations, which included considerations of regional extent, incorporating biological lines of evidence that demonstrated interdependence between trophic levels, and the relationship between land and people.

3. Consensus-Based Collaboration

FNNND drove objectives in the monitoring program design and urged data sharing and communication.

Indigenous Governments: YFNSSA



Federal Government

Territorial Government

Research Partners



Proponent/Receiver

Ecological and Social Outcomes

Biological Monitoring

Benthic invertebrates, algae, fish, ungulates




Adult Arctic grayling caught on Haggart Creek, August 2025.

Data Sovereignty
Data Sharing and Communication

Accessible and available to all affected stakeholders

Physical and Chemical Monitoring

Surface water, groundwater, sediment quality



Cyanide (Weak Acid Dissociable) and Nitrite concentrations measured in Haggart Creek 2 km downstream of effluent inflow, January through August 2025.

Ecosystem Services and Culture

Cultural food sources, on the land activities, cumulative impacts

Human Health Risk Assessment

Restoring Cultural Connection

Safe Drinking Water




Elders of FNNND fishing for spring Arctic grayling, April 2004.

As of May 2025 concentrations of cyanide in Haggart Creek were below the BC guidelines for chronic effects to aquatic life, due to interception of contaminated surface and groundwaters which have been treated and/or stored. Other contaminants such as nitrite and cobalt remain elevated above levels that could cause adverse effects.



The Failures Before the Failure: Systemic Issues that Contributed to the Crisis



Failures Before the Failure


- Responsible Company?
- Responsible Government and Regulators?
- Responsible Industry?



June 24, 2024. Source: VGC



Heap Leach Facility Schematic




Schematic and not to scale



Independent Review Board's Findings

Primary causes of the failure

1. Placement of low permeability ore in the 975 lift (and also in 955, 965, 985 and possibly more)
 - Design based on high permeability ore but operations did not deliver it



Independent Review Board's Findings

2. Impairment of the leach solution collection system

- No mechanical connection between lateral collection pipes and main lines
- Sandy drainage material plugged perforations in pipes






Figure 4.2: April 30, 2021, ponding (green) on exposed ODF at northeast side of heap



Independent Review Board's Findings

3. Over-steepened HLF slope


- 22.5° overall as compared to 19.7° for design
- 36.5° between access ramps – in places up to 35 m high



Independent Review Board's Findings

4. Water accumulation above the 975 lift due to aggressive irrigation in spring/summer 2024


- Perched and rising water table



Independent Review Board's Findings

5. Liquefiable conditions in the ore under leach and In Heap Pond

- Conditions for a catastrophic failure



Schematic and not to scale



Independent Review Board's Findings

Rising water table due to aggressive leaching (4), low permeability ore (1), and impaired leach collection system (2) caused a slope failure in the over-steepened slope (3) at and above the 975 lift – which triggered a much larger flow slide in liquefiable ore (5).



Other Observations and Findings

- Independent Review Board and/or Delve Underground Investigation into the Causes of the HLF Failure
 - Winter ore stacking – ore stacked during every winter month
 - Over 325 days in every year up to 2023
 - Maximum per design was 275
 - Solution heating only operated for a few months in the first year of operation
 - Side slope seepage on the HLF required seepage collection systems, French drain
 - Ponding on top of heap
 - Sand boils on top of heap
 - Liner system construction allowed deterioration of critical liner layers
 - Liner left exposed for average of 10.9 months in area relevant to failure
 - Geosynthetic clay liner degraded as a result in some areas
 - Much of existing liner may be affected
 - Drain material at base of heap less permeable than planned



There is no evidence that YG considered these matters during licensing or assessment, that inspectors identified these as matters of concern, or that YG engaged qualified experts to conduct geotechnical inspections or review final designs or as-builts reports

HLF - Concerns and Variances from Design	VGC Role	Yukon Government Response or Action
Placement of low-permeability ore on the HLF	Accountable party	None*
Poor construction of leach collection system	Accountable party	None
Over-steepened slope on HLF	Accountable party	None
Aggressive irrigation on upper lifts	Accountable party	None
Seepage on face of HLF	Response to symptom, not to causes	None
Construction of French drain	Response to symptom, not to causes	None
Ponding and sand boils on top of heap	Response to symptom, not to causes	None
Liquefiable ore	Not evaluated in design	None
Extensive winter ore stacking	Accountable party	Approval for winter stacking after 3 years of operations
Lack of solution heating	Accountable party	None
Changes in drainage material characteristics	Accountable party	None
Lack of protection of liner from frost damage, hydration under unconfined conditions	Accountable party	None



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Responsible
Company?
FAIL

Responsible
Regulator?
FAIL



Operational Leach Solution Management

- Events Pond primary purpose
 - Critical risk management capacity for high-risk water containing cyanide
- VGC failed to provide required Desired Available Storage (DAS) for substantial periods in every operating year before 2024:
 - 2020: Approximately mid-May to mid-August
 - 2021: May 10-July 17
 - 2022: April 27-July 7, July 22-25, **Sep. 24-Dec. 31**
 - 2023: Jan. 1-Feb 11, May 3-June 7, Oct. 11-22
- Highest risk event in late 2022 – **a Near Miss!**
 - Less than 1.5 days of storage for a pumping system failure
 - Company experiencing pumps system challenges and maintenance
 - Temperature hovering around -40°C
 - In-Heap Pond above Red Alert level, Events Pond nearly full
 - No cyanide treatment capacity



Operational Leach Solution Management

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Responsible Company?
FAIL



Operational Leach Solution Management

- **How did Yukon Government respond?**
 - 2020: No explicit identification or notice about failing to meet DAS
 - 2021: May inspection report notes that DAS “may” have been exceeded no evidence of any follow-up
 - 2022: May/June inspection report finally explicitly cites failure to meet DAS and requires implementation of contingency plans, but no explicit order or direction
 - 2022: October inspection requires more frequent reporting until the “treatment plant can begin treating and discharging water next year”
 - 2023: Spring event, no mention; fall event noted in one inspection report, no evidence of follow-up
- May 2023: Yukon Government finally charges VGC for offences related to exceedance of DAS in 2021 and summer 2022. **The charges did not extend to the egregious exceedances in late 2022.**



Operational Leach Solution Management

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- 2022: May/June inspection report finally explicitly cites failure to meet DAS and requires implementation of contingency plans, but no explicit order or direction
- 2022: October inspection requires more frequent reporting until the “treatment plant can begin treating and discharging water next year”
- 2023: Spring event, no mention; fall event noted in one inspection report, no evidence of follow-up
- May 2023: Yukon Government finally charges VGC for offences related to exceedance of DAS in 2021 and summer 2022. **The charges did not extend to the egregious exceedances in late 2022.**

Responsible Regulator?
Is this good enough for a
PASS?



Water Treatment Capacity

Metals and Suspended Solids: Non-Cyanide

- Water Quality Failures
 - **April 2020: Discharge of non-compliant mine-contact water (high suspended solids, arsenic and iron – no cyanide)**
 - Similar water quality conditions in 2021 and 2022 addressed by storage in Events Pond (DAS)
 - **Plans for emergency storage pond and “high volume ADR filtration plant” never completed**
- **Water licence required water treatment in place before start of HLF Phase 2**
- Water Treatment Plant commissioned in early 2023, only days before HLF Phase 2
- **Site conditions demonstrated that water treatment was needed sooner, but VGC chose not to respond**



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Responsible Company?
FAIL



Water Treatment Capacity Metals and Suspended Solids: Non-Cyanide

- Yukon Government response
 - 2020
 - Inspector's Direction – develop freshet management plan
 - Warning letter
 - 2021, 2022, 2023
 - Little follow-up with freshet management VGC relying on use of DAS capacity instead, compromising space for high-risk cyanide solution



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**Responsible Regulator?
PASS in 2020, and
then...?**



Water Treatment Capacity - Cyanide

- Water licence:
 - Cyanide detoxification plant operational before HLF Phase 1
 - Water treatment plant with capacity to treat 691 m³/day of cyanide solution before HLF Phase 2
- VGC did not construct a cyanide detoxification plant for Phase 1
 - No evidence of action from YG until late 2022
- Cyanide treatment system established in February 2023
 - Four page “design” that replaced a design that was approved during licensing
 - No lab, bench-scale or pilot testing, no detailed designs
 - FNNND water treatment expert identified significant concerns that were never addressed
 - YG concluded the system was acceptable, but no evidence that YG engaged a water treatment expert
 - Treatment system proved ineffective when the failure occurred



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Responsible Company?
FAIL

Responsible Regulator?
FAIL



Is There More? Pass or Fail?

- **Five earlier spills of cyanide from the HLF system**
 - No substantive enforcement action
 - YG engaged expert to review cyanide management
 - Report in July 2022
 - January 2023 direction to provide implementation plan by February 2023
 - VGC provided plan in November 2023
 - Many recommendations still outstanding when the failure occurred
- **January 2024 slope failure on the HLF**
 - Single ore bench of 23 m, significantly exceeding the design height of 12 m (i.e., an over-steepened slope)
 - Frozen drainage layer
 - Damaged clay liner
 - No evidence that YG engaged a qualified expert to inspect the failure or advise about causes or adequacy of responses
 - No evidence that VGC used this as a learning experience to improve its HLF operations
- **Approximately 20 reportable spills in the first year of operation alone**



What About the Permitting Stage

- Original water licensing, 2014/15
 - YG intervention does not address HLF design
 - No evidence that YG engaged qualified experts to review the design
- Licence amendment, 2018/19
 - Substantial change in location and design of HLF and other mine components, but regulators decided no YESAA assessment was needed
 - YG intervention does not address HLF design
 - YG does not raise any concerns about HLF or mine design at Technical Pre-Hearing Conference
 - YG does not participate in Public Hearing
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Responsible Regulator?
FAIL



What About the Industry As a Whole?

- **Industry guidelines aimed at raising the bar and building corporate accountability**
 - Mining Association of Canada, Towards Sustainable Mining
 - Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management
 - Canadian Dam Association, Application of Dam Safety Guidelines to Mining Dams
 - Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance
 - International Cyanide Code
- **Yukon Chamber of Mines**
 - Website does not recommend or require members to sign on to national or international industry leading organizations (and VGC chose not to belong even to the Mining Association of Canada or the International Cyanide Code)
 - Towards Sustainable Mining has been in place for more than 20 years, but there appears to be not a single reference on the Chamber of Mines website
 - 17 months in and no evidence of concrete action to make changes to address the fallout from the Eagle Gold disaster



Where Does This Leave Us?

- **Important investigative reports have been delivered**
 - IRB Report
 - Delve Report
- **VGC's actions contributed substantially to the failure**
- Government and regulatory systems were not effective in identifying and responding to what should have been clear indicators of significant problems




Where Does This Leave Us?

- **A massive cultural shift is needed for government**
 - Better and more informed oversight of design, construction and operations
 - Engagement of and reliance on qualified experts, and improvement of internal capacity
 - Clear enforcement authority that is not tempered by political interests
 - Requirements for independent tailings review boards (industry best-practice)
 - Recognize and effectively manage the downside risks of mining
 - Mining company risk tolerance levels versus public government risk tolerance
 - Leadership = taking action against or shutting down mining projects that don't comply with acceptable risk (environmental or financial) for the public
 - Leadership $\neq$ allowing mining companies to offload their downside risks onto the public and local communities



Where Are We Now? What has Changed?



In the Environment

- Grayling and sculpins (summer) in Haggart Creek
- Grayling and pike (winter) in the South McQuesten River
- Aquatic insects in Haggart Creek
- Moose and caribou in the McQuesten River watershed
- Beavers, muskrats, mink, and otters in traplines downriver of the mine.




In the Systems

- Broken Industry Relationships
- Broken Mineral Legislation
- FNNND's Land Use Planning MOU
- FNNND's Mining Policy
- New Yukon Government



What Needs to Happen Next




A Public Inquiry

- If we want real change, we need to understand all the factors that led to this catastrophe.
- Goes beyond the scope of the IRB, and identifies the specific, systemic failures within Yukon Government and industry.
- Provides meaningful, authentic, and transparent accountability for the entities that have a responsibility in this crisis.
- This is not just a Na-Cho Nyak Dun crisis.
This is a Yukon crisis, and Yukoners have a right to know how this happened.




Implementation of IRB's recommendations

- Yukon Government waited to make any kind of commitment to the IRB Report's recommendations until the final days before an election.
- The newly elected Yukon Government must make a clear, meaningful commitment to the implementation of these recommendations, accompanied by a thorough action plan.
- Prioritizing this work through budget.



New Mineral Legislation - developed with Yukon First Nations

- Updated mineral legislation that is aligned with the Umbrella Final Agreement and Yukon First Nation Final Agreements.
- Legislation that brings Yukon up to the regulatory standard of our neighbouring jurisdictions
- Legislation that brings teeth to regulation. Creating meaningful accountability.



Understand and Adhere to Yukon First Nations' own Mining Policies & Land Use Planning.

- FNNND signed an MOU with Yukon Government for Land Use Planning (More on this tomorrow)
- The day of the Eagle Gold Mine Disaster, FNNND published our own Mining Policy.
- Informed by our inherent, Aboriginal, and Treaty rights and title: as a Self-Governing First Nation who have been stewards of our lands and waters since time immemorial, this policy, *"aims to provide clarity and transparency to Proponents seeking to conduct mineral exploration and development in the FNNND Traditional Territory, from staking a claim, to exploration activities, to constructing and operating a mine, to closure, Reclamation, and ecological Restoration"*



Trust Rebuilt Through Actions

- Many mining operators throughout the territory strive for responsible and sustainability in their work, and strive for positive authentic relationships with the First Nations whose land they work on.
- But, Eagle Gold eroded that trust, and that is everyone's responsibility to rebuild.
- We had lots of good words with Eagle Gold. In order to repair this relationship, and move forward together in mining, we need good actions.



Q&A

